James Traub discusses the troubled relationship between the UN and the world's only superpower.
Jim Traub, whose compelling articles appear regularly the New York Times
Sunday Magazine, is our featured speaker. He has written a wonderful book
about Kofi
Annan and the United Nations, entitled The
Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power.
As he brings the United Nations to life for all of us this morning, I assure
you that he will discuss it with his usual verve and wit.
To introduce Jim, I have asked Barbara Crossette to do the honors. An undeniably talented journalist, Barbara is someone who was there at the beginning of Kofi Annan's term and knows only too well of the challenges of covering the United Nations and of its Secretary-General.
Before we begin, I just want to briefly say a few words about Barbara's illustrious
career. Many of you may know her from her stint covering the United Nations
from 1994-2001 as The New York Times bureau chief. Earlier, she was the
Times' chief correspondent in Southeast Asia and South Asia. She has
reported from Central America, the Caribbean, and Canada, and has been Deputy
Foreign Editor and Senior Editor in charge of The Times' weekend news
operations.
In 1991, Barbara won the George Polk Award for foreign reporting for her coverage
of the assassination in India of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. In 1998,
she won the Twenty-Five Year Achievement Award of the Silurians, a society of
New York journalists; and the Award for International Reporting from InterAction,
a coalition of more than 150 international nonprofit aid and development organizations.
She also is the recipient of the Business Council of the United Nations' Korn
Ferry Award for outstanding reporting on the organization, and the United Nations
Correspondents' Association Lifetime Achievement Award. Since leaving the United
Nations, she has worked with journalists in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma,
and Brazil.
Please join me in giving a very warm welcome to these two journalists. Barbara?
BARBARA CROSSETTE: Thank you. It's nice to be back here. I'm going to be very brief because James has a lot to talk about—Jim, or Jimmy to his dad.
I first met Jim on a crate of a military flight from Cyprus to Baghdad in 1998. He will give you more details on that. All other journalists on the plane were extremely envious because we had been told that he had got some kind of special access and was going to be doing a magazine article for The New York Times—me most of all, I guess. But in any case, we soon found that he was a remarkable colleague. He was self-effacing and in the background. He waited patiently for scores of mandarins and various people on both sides, the UN delegation and the Iraqi delegation, in order to extract an awful lot of information about what was happening and the atmosphere. All of this is in the book.
He also, unlike many of my other colleagues, did not steal my news story, which
was nice. In any case, this sense of respect and credibility that we all saw
in operation there has carried him through. I can't but think—and I have
not asked him this, so it may be unfair be say so—that he established such
a good rapport with the highest ranks of the United Nations that they felt very
confident in opening the doors to all kinds of private meetings, to trips, to
a variety of events, and certainly access to many important people who seemed,
I would judge, to speak to him with enormous candor and also, as I said, with
trust, knowing that he would handle all this information in a fair way. And
he has.
I don't want to make the book sound too fair, because in this day and age you
have to be nasty. He'll talk about its themes and so on. I won't.
Just to say, though, that if anyone that you know or yourselves ever need a
very good account of, not just what this Secretary-General has been through
and who he is, but the secretary-generalship of the United Nations, which isn't
often examined this well—never this well, as far as I can tell—and
also, beyond that, I think, the kind of book that we all wish we had been able
to distribute when the United Nations was under such ignorant pressure over
the last couple of years—I say when you are finished here, get one not
just for you but for your congressman and your senator, because we now maybe
have a new chance to take a new look at the U.S. relationship with the United
Nations, and this book is a remarkable basis on which to build your knowledge.
Jim?
Remarks
JAMES TRAUB: Barbara, thanks for that ridiculously gracious introduction.
I'm so happy to be here, because so many times I have sat somewhere at that
table, craning my neck, looking up, it's nice to be able to actually look out
at everybody.
Now, I'm really not going to talk about any of those things that Barbara just
foreshadowed, though I'm happy to answer questions about them. I thought, given
that we are still in the kind of euphoric afterglow of the elections—not
for everybody here, I'm sure, but for 97 percent of you—that I would talk
about the end part of the subtitle, that is to say "in the era of American
world power," and I would talk about U.S.-UN relations, which is a major
theme of the book.
I start from a funny little insignificant incident, but still telling to me.
Towards the end of the time that I was doing the research and, as Barbara said,
sitting in on meetings, there was a meeting about Ethiopia-Eritrea. This was
a meeting among Kofi Annan and his chief lieutenants. In the course of long
discussions—"how can we possibly get to these people? "Who can
talk to them?" and so on—I forget who, but one of the officials said,
"Well, have we talked to the Africa Desk at the State Department?"
Well, it turned out that the only folks who could talk to both the Ethiopians
and Eritreans were in Washington.
Now, there was nothing extraordinary about the moment. I mean what actually
struck me is how underneath this unbelievable turbulence that Barbara alluded
to, and that has been so marked the last few years, there is this dense web
of ties between any American administration and the United Nations, just because
the United States occupies this unique position in the world; and there actually
is a great deal of business being transacted all the time, though you'd never
know this from listening to this ongoing onslaught against the United Nations
that comes out of Washington. And so, what struck me was both the aspect of
how deeply the United Nations depends on the engagement of the United States,
but also how in many ways forthcoming Washington is towards the United Nations,
despite everything, and how enduring that relationship is. So that struck me
because, I guess, I too was so taken up by all of the fervent rhetoric.
I want to just briefly trace just the last decade or so of this relationship
and then end by very briefly looking forward and asking what these elections
and so forth can mean.
One thing, I think, which is worth recalling is that the Bush Administration
did not invent unilateralism. The critique of the United States in the United
Nations, as being scornful of the United Nations and of its obligations there,
long predates the Bush Administration, but specifically in its modern form really
comes from the mid-1990s, when the good, multilateral Clinton Administration
decided very unilaterally that it couldn't live any more with Boutros
Boutros-Ghali and did something which had never really happened before—at
least never successfully— which is it prevented a sitting Secretary-General
from succeeding himself.
It is worth recalling why that happened. Part of it was because you had the
situation of a Democratic president with a Republican-controlled Congress, and
that Republican-controlled Congress was really controlled by yahoos, not to
put too fine a point on it. For those people, the United Nations was really
their bête noir.
But it was also true that the Clinton Administration felt that it needed to
find a good way of working with the United Nations, and they viewed Boutros-Ghali
as being an obstacle to their doing so. Now, other countries may have felt so,
but would not have succeeded in thereby deposing a Secretary-General. So it
was not merely that the Clinton Administration was under pressure from the Right;
it was that for its own reasons it wished this and, by virtue of the unique
power the United States has, it was able to accomplish this.
So not only this fact was so, but the critique of American behavior was very,
very intense at that time. I'm sure you all remember this famous phrase that
Hubert
Vedrine, the French defense minister, used—the "hyperpower"—that
America wasn't a superpower, it was a hyperpower. Well, that was coined during
the Clinton years, not during the Bush years.
The atmosphere in the United Nations which Kofi Annan inherited, the atmosphere
from the late 1990s, was really poisonous because of American unilateralism.
If you go back to that time, you'll remember there was the Helms-Biden
Act, which imposed unilaterally a set of reforms on the United Nations,
at the same time as also demanding that the United States be allowed to reduce
its annual contribution to the United Nations from 25 percent of the budget
to 22 percent of the budget. This was a cause of unbelievable agony. I mean,
in many ways the emotional temperature was not so different from what it was
during the Iraq debate in 2002 and 2003.
During that time, the United States was not paying its dues; it was getting
further and further in arrears. It was at one point in danger of being kicked
out of the General Assembly, or at least in hypothetical danger of that. Famously,
our greatest ally in the United Nations, Jeremy
Greenstock, the U.K. Ambassador, said at one point, making a point in saying
it in front of our then-Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke, that the United States—let me get the expression right here—"has
muffled its voice and stained its reputation." That's pretty bad.
So that's how things stood as of that time. In fact, it is hard to remember
now, but one of Kofi Annan's greatest achievements in his first years in office
was to bring the United States back into the United Nations. I mean it's hard
to remember now because that's going to be one of the greatest obligations of
Kofi Annan's successor, which tends to make you think this is a perennial problem
and not just a momentary aberration because of this extraordinary, highly ideological
administration. But really, acting with Richard Holbrooke, they were able together
to persuade an extremely reluctant General Assembly to buy off on these unilateral
American demands, coupled with the unilateral American demand for lowering its
annual dues payments, and move on.
One moral of that story, by the way, is that here the United States was driving
the most bullying imaginable bargain—which is to say, "You will accept
zero budget, you will accept all these reforms which we believe in whether you
do or not, and you will also accept that the United States is going to reduce
its annual payments, in exchange for which the United States agrees to pay you
back part—not even all—of the arrears that it owes." You could
not have had a more bullying transaction than that. But it was accepted.
Why? In part, because of adroit diplomacy. But the underlying fact, which I
think the Bush Administration refused to acknowledge, is that the United States
can get its way at the United Nations quite easily because, for all of the rhetorical
anger there is, for all the difference of opinion, almost all states recognize
that they have no choice but to have the United States be deeply engaged. And
so there is a long history of the United States getting its way for arguably
unfair terms.
So, in that sense, there is a huge built-in advantage which any American administration
has going into the United Nations. It takes a lot to fritter that advantage
away. I think probably you could view the failed debate over war in Iraq as
a kind of laboratory experiment, which is to say: What do you have to do to
fritter away that colossal advantage so that on a matter of supreme importance
to the United States the United States cannot get what it wants?
In any case, in effect, the status quo ante circa the moment George Bush enters
the White House is this quite recent embittered past, this sense of America
using its hegemonic power in an increasingly gratuitous and irritating way,
but also this success, this kind of new bargain that had been reached.
Obviously, then, something changes radically to put us where we are now. I would
say that that something could be phrased something like this: The continuing
fact of America's extraordinary power, which allowed it to act on its own if
it so wished in a way that could not be said of other states, and then two new
things—one, of course, being this new ideological position of the Bush
Administration, the sense that acting through international organizations is
a way of diminishing your sovereignty and diminishing your power, as opposed
to a way of amplifying it, which was the sort of traditional, old-fashioned
view that Truman
had established at the outset of U.S.-UN relations; and then, of course, 9/11.
Now, even before 9/11 you could see how different this was going to be, because
you had a whole series of treaties that the United States withdrew from or refused
to sign—Kyoto,
refused to sign; International
Criminal Court, in effect, the Bush Administration, kind of gleefully, de-signed
it and then went about trying to strike bilateral deals with various countries
based on its having un-signed this thing. So that was already there.
But it hadn't really affected the kind of ongoing peace and security relations
or Security Council relations at the highest degree. During the campaign, Condi
Rice had specifically talked about withdrawing from our peacekeeping obligations
in the Balkans, but it produced such an uproar that she quickly backed off.
And so, in fact, there was no attempt on the part of the Bush Administration
to unravel those things, as opposed to unraveling the treaties.
Now, 9/11 obviously changed everything, in the sense that matters of supreme
geopolitical calculation were suddenly entrained by this and were going to come
before the Security Council. Even then, it is important to remember what did
not change.
In the fall of 2002, when the debate really began—would we go to war in
Iraq or not?—I'm sure you recall that public opinion polls showed that
the solid majority of the American people said, "Yeah, it's a good idea
to go to war in Iraq as long as our allies agree and the United Nations gives
it the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval." So there was just a kind of
default consensual sense that this legitimacy thing the United Nations has really
matters, and we shouldn't go to war unless we will have it, and presumably we
will get it if we have a just cause.
It didn't immediately change public opinion, of course. What it did immediately
change was the climate inside the Bush Administration. It was sort of like a
lighting bolt striking a jar of chemicals, that it catalyzed something. That
something you could call this neoconservative vision of transformation. Certainly
also, a deep sense of vulnerability, that because everything is so much more
urgent than it was before, we can no longer allow ourselves any kind of constraint.
You can, for example, compare the debate over Iraq in 2003 to the debate over
Iraq in 1998, which Barbara referred to, which is what led to this lightning
trip to Baghdad that Kofi Annan took in the hopes of persuading Saddam
Hussein to allow weapons inspectors back in. At that time, for all that
it was a very grave issue, the fact is the United States and other states were
willing to allow Kofi Annan to, in effect, kind of wiggle in, find a tiny little
opening where he could have an important role, and then have a very important
role. He did succeed in doing something that seemed quite remarkable at the
time, though, inevitably I think, it unraveled, and the bombing went ahead nine
or ten months later.
This time around, in 2003, there was no such space. First of all, the ideological
thing—that is, what the Clinton Administration had felt was "We've
got to find a way to make this institution work in a way that is consonant with
our own national security interests," and that's really why, at bottom,
they felt Boutros-Ghali had to go, because they couldn't make the institution
work in the way they wanted it to, or so they felt, as long as he was there.
This time you had a greater sense of urgency, far greater sense of urgency—"we
must act"—but with none of that sense of "and it is really important
to find a way to act with the United Nations."
So then comes the story that all of you know, this ugly debate, this failed
debate, and this ruinous moment, and the sense of having reached a kind of Rubicon,
which Kofi Annan later phrased as "a fork in the road"—"we
have reached a fork in the road, and we must either reform the institution in
some radical way or we risk becoming irrelevant."
Now, interestingly, on reflection, he turns out to have been wrong, because
the radical reform effort which he then introduced didn't really succeed, at
least not in the terms he was talking about. And yet, the problem that he was
worried about, which is essentially "the United States will leave because
they will find this place hostile or unuseful," actually didn't happen.
So it is interesting. If you take the low watermark of U.S.-UN relations as
that debate, and then, I think, extending onwards through 2004—the Oil-for-Food
Programme mess and so on—yet, at the same time, something else was
also asserting itself. I think that something else is the United States discovered
the limits of this dynamic which it had sketched out, which was "we will
act with our friends in a coalition of the willing and do what needs to be done."
So by the end of 2003, by six months after this debate, which had included,
of course, all these contemptuous references to the United Nations by Dick
Cheney and so forth, suddenly the United States discovered they were blocked
in Iraq. Why were they blocked? Not that they didn't have the military bite,
but it turned out that this infuriating thing called legitimacy was not self-conferring.
That is, the Bush Administration view was "legitimacy is what we do; we're
legitimate."
Jesse Helms used to always say this, "What do you mean the UN gives
us legitimacy? We have legitimacy. We can give it to somebody else."
But it didn't happen, because it turned out that this irritating old character,
Ayatollah
Sistani, really mattered to the Iraqis. When he said, "We're not going
to accept your vision for how our future should look," the Iraqis said,
"Well, then we won't."
And so, by the end of 2003, Paul
Bremer was being recalled back to the White House and his plan, which he
was going to impose on the Iraqis, was scrapped. Then, lo and behold, the Bush
Administration eagerly turns to the United Nations, basically to save its bacon,
and Lakhdar
Brahimi, who was a seasoned UN envoy, then goes to Iraq, as he had previously
in Afghanistan, and talks to Ayatollah Sistani, as Sergio
Vieira de Mello, the previous envoy who had been killed in this terrible
bombing, had done as well. The fact that the United Nations could talk to this
guy mattered.
I think Brahimi told me that when any envoy from the Americans had said to Sistani,
"Look, you can't demand an election by the summer of 2004 because nobody
can organize an election that fast; it just can't happen," Sistani thought,
"They're lying; I don't know why they're lying, but they're lying because
they're Americans, and so I don't believe a word they are saying." Brahimi
then repeated the same argument. He said, "Well, if you tell me so, I believe
you." Now, that's power. That's a certain kind of power.
It was very hard for the Bush Administration to acknowledge that power, but
they had no choice. And so they had reached, in effect, the limits of their
own capacity to act autonomously. And so, from that time forward, in effect,
the United Nations began reasserting itself, because the United States had no
choice in the matter. So you see this throughout 2004.
Now, I come along in this story in the middle of 2004. That's when I began writing
this book. You couldn't help feeling like there were two different voices speaking
simultaneously from Washington, contending with each other. And so, on the one
hand, you had this deepening relationship over Iraq and demands by the United
States that the United Nations run that election, which was going to be in January
of 2005, in a way that was going to make it effective; that it increase its
presence in Iraq, even though the security situation was kind of impossible—so
there was the wish to have a deeper, richer engagement at the same time as this
kind of regular torrent of criticism.
And so, by the late fall of 2004, you had the situation where Kofi Annan seemed
to be basically hanging by a thread. You had Norm
Coleman, a U.S. senator, calling for him to step down; all the American
conservative publications calling for him to step down, concerted critique;
and silence from the White House; and the feeling inside the thirty-eighth floor
of the United Nations, "Well, if these guys care so much about us, why
can't they call off the dogs?"—because all you needed was a signal
from the White House and it would stop.
There was a terrible period in early December, which was in the midst of the
Oil-for-Food scandal and the sexual
abuse scandal in the Congo. Everything bad was happening—real fear
that the Iraq election would go south, and this sense of terrible brittleness
and danger—and "Where is the White House? Isn't someone going to ride
to our rescue?"
In fact, finally—I think it was December 8th or something—the fever
broke, and someone at a meeting I attended said, "Something happened yesterday.
McCain was authorized to come to our defense, and Danforth (then the ambassador)
is going to say something tomorrow morning." No one ever knew what happened,
but something or other happened.
A week later, Kofi Annan went to talk to Condoleezza Rice. Now, there had been
a fear that she wouldn't even talk to him, but in fact they had a great conversation.
She said, "Thank you for Iraq, and thank you for this, and thank you for
that, and we want to work with you." It was like, "What's the problem?"
In fact, when I went to talk to her some while afterwards, I said, "Tell
me what you were all thinking at that time."
She said, "I don't know what you mean."
I said, "Well, there must have been some internal debate."
She said, "No there wasn't. There was never a problem with the relationship.
We were always very happy and comfortable with Kofi Annan. He was always very
straight." That's Condoleezza Rice. And this continued. You know, "The
election of January 2005 was great, thank you, thank you, thank you, thank you."
But then the Volcker Commission comes back, the fear that once again Kofi Annan
[cell phone ringing interruption]—I'm just going to continue as if nothing
is happening.
So this continues, these two voices. Indeed, I would say it has probably continued
for the last several years. I mean, in mid-2005 there was a movement in the
Congress to basically tie U.S. contributions to the United Nations to, again,
a series of unilaterally demanded reforms. And again, silence from the White
House.
Then, all of a sudden, mid-June, Nick Burns, the number three guy in the State
Department, says, "We think this is a bad idea, we're opposed to it,"
and it goes away.
Here is something to which I was never a party, which is: What were the fights
between Condoleezza Rice and Dick Cheney—or whomever? I don't know the
answer to that. You can just infer it from the external symptoms.
So this whole great drama of John
Bolton and his role at the United Nations plays out within this weird duality.
At another moment, when Bolton first arrives, in August of 2005, in the midst
of this big debate over reform, he speaks to the chief officials involved at
the United Nations and the General Assembly and says, "Look, this whole
process is a mess, it's a failure. We're going to throw the whole thing out,
and we're going to do this and we're going to do that." Everybody is shocked.
And so, Bob
Orr, who was the chief liaison of the Annan administration to the Bush Administration,
calls up his contacts at the State Department and says, "Bolton just said
all these things. Is that policy?" His contact said, "He said what?"
So Bob said, "Well, he said this and this." So then, half an hour
later, he gets a phone message saying, "Cool it, don't worry," meaning
"That's not our policy."
Well, this continued the whole time. It was never easy to say what the policy
was, because the fact is there were at least two policies, canceling each other
out.
In the end, actually, I think Bolton was given far more of a leash than he ought
to have been and was able to use that latitude to do real lasting damage—certainly
to the reform process, and arguably to the institution—but all at the same
time as Condoleezza Rice, quite sincerely, has insisted that she wants to have
this good, pragmatic relationship with the institution.
Indeed, since the beginning of the second term, she has clearly been allowed
to trace out a diplomatic path which is very different from the one that was
before. Part of that is: "The United Nations is okay. We'll use them for
some things and not for other things. But it's a pragmatic relationship."
So I think probably, if you look back at this moment historically, you will
say, "We lived through the low watermark of U.S.-UN relations." Now
things are getting better, though still with profound bitterness and acrimony
present all the time—the wound is exposed again all the time but trending
upwards.
An interesting question for the future is the following. I don't think having
the same administration with Democratic majorities in the House and Senate changes
very much the relationship between the two bodies. It just strengthens the hand
of people like Rice and others who argue for a more pragmatic relationship.
But let's say we have a Democratic president, whoever—Hillary somebody—in
2008 and a Democratic Congress, a situation we obviously haven't had in a long
time. In effect, you would then ask: What is the positive baseline of U.S.-UN
relations? That is to say, what would an essentially multilaterally inclined
administration with a multilaterally inclined Congress look like?
I think the hope that it would kind of look like Danish-UN relations is probably
misplaced. It would be nice. But the fact is when you are the United States,
you are not going to behave like nice, little other small European countries
do. And frankly, if France were the United States, they would be a lot worse.
It is just in the nature of being a hegemonic power, it is in the nature of
being a continental power, where you can feel sovereignty is absolute.
In thinking about the future there is some grounds to be hopeful, if only in
a sense that the worst is behind us, I think. But it would be wrong to imagine
that there is this kind of doctrinal off/on switch and it is now going to be,
"If only we can elect a Democrat in 2008, it is going to be thrown to 'on'
and then this deeply problematic, though also shot through with idealism, relationship
will become unproblematic." It will never become unproblematic. It is simply
the nature of the United States and the nature of its relationship with the
institution.
Let me stop there. I'd be happy to take questions on anything.
JOANNE MYERS: Thank you very much for that well-balanced presentation.
Questions and Answers
QUESTION: Thank you very much. Edward Mortimer from—surprise, surprise—the
office of Kofi Annan. I would like to make one comment and ask one question.
The comment is that I think your last point is absolutely right. The very good
evidence for this is that the problems all—obviously, problems have gone
on ever since the 1950s, or before—but the problems in their modern form,
if you like, started actually precisely in the period when there was a Democratic
president and a Democratic majority in Congress.
It was October 1993 when Black
Hawk came down in Mogadishu, and at the time Morton
Halperin was supposed to be writing something called PDD-13, which was all
about how the United States was going to go in for constructive engagement and
multilateralism and play a big part in UN peacekeeping. By the time that came
out, in a sort of incredible piece of poetic justice, at the beginning of April
1994, at the exact moment when the genocide was starting in Rwanda, it was all
about how the United States not only would not participate in UN peacekeeping
but would not allow a peacekeeping operation to happen, except in very, very
tightly defined circumstances. So they didn't wait for a Republican Congress
before they turned tail and decided to put the blame on the United Nations for
the problems of their foreign policy.
My question is about the current Bush Administration. Obviously, there is not
complete harmony within it. I guess there seldom is in any big government, and
there are different currents and there are a lot of internal arguments. But
you almost implied that you thought—and I just wonder whether you do think—isn't
there also a streak of Machiavellianism?
I mean, yes, we deal with a lot of very nice people, starting with the Secretary
of State, for whom there is never any problem about the Secretary-General. But,
of course, in terms of having a Secretary-General who can't really afford to
get far out of line with what they want him to do, having these Colemans and
Fox News and all those people baying at his heels day after day, doesn't that
suit them pretty well?
JAMES TRAUB: Oh, absolutely. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to imply that this
was purely on the level of doctrine. I think when you ask why have they allowed
Kofi Annan to sort of dangle this way, the answer is because that way he can
be really grateful when they save him from the burning pit. And so I can't believe
that this is a coincidence.
The other effect it has had is that Annan has always been viewed by a large
sector of opinion in the developing world as the puppet of the West, and above
all of the United States. Well, this has increased it enormously—first,
going back into Iraq very quickly after war, when much of the world was violently
opposed to the war; but then, this whole sense of Washington is kind of dancing
to their tune because they fire bullet at its feet and say, "dance."
One of the poignant things that I was present for during this period, the end
of 2004 and the beginning of 2005, was people begging Annan to stand up for
the institution and stand up for himself. Why didn't he do so? It's not in his
nature. But he also didn't do so because he was advised—I think rightly—that
if he stood up for himself and stood up for the institution, he would therefore
have to be standing up against something, and that something would be America.
And then, instead of having one senator calling for his resignation, you'd have
forty senators calling for his resignation.
This is what it means to fight a bully. You can't do what's just, you have to
accept unjust rules; or you can fight against them and win a moral battle but
lose the important battle. Kofi Annan is the kind of person who, if he has to
choose between ego and getting something done, he'll let his ego get beaten
up in order to get something done.
QUESTION: In your book, Jim, you indicated that Kofi Annan was basically
middle of the road, a not terribly impressive individual, until he found a Ted
Sorensen in Ed Mortimer over there. At that point, everything started to
change in terms of his presentation, including his appearance, his staff, his
clothing, and so on.
But there is a question here too. When Paul
Volcker's report on the Oil-for-Food scandal was released, the following
day Claudia
Rosett asked him a very pointed question: "Mr. Volcker, now that your
report is out, can you say, very simply, is Kofi Annan an honest man?"
Volcker dissembled, embarrassedly, for minutes and never answered the question.
Now, you have spent a lot of time with Kofi Annan. Essentially, what is your
overall evaluation of the man?
JAMES TRAUB: Kofi Annan is an honest man. I think that can be stated unequivocally.
That's an easy one. I mean that's not a hard one for me.
Yes, I describe a lot of his drawbacks, and it doesn't make Edward's life easier
that I say lots of nice things about Edward and other people who work for and
with him but I say some tough things about him. I'd be happy to go on about
these other aspects.
But I think the first thing to be said is that there really was an orchestrated
campaign by people who didn't like the institution to use this Oil-for-Food
scandal in order to destroy the institution. I mean it cannot be a coincidence
that there were few, if any, people who were generally internationalists who
viewed the Oil-for-Food scandal as the be-all and the end-all of the United
Nations. It's not even, in a way, like the Monica Lewinsky scandal, where you
had plenty of Democrats saying, "This is a terrible thing," so you
could say it must be a terrible thing if they think so.
In the case of Oil-for-Food, virtually the entire attack—certainly the
spear point of the attack—came from people who didn't like the institution
in the first place. Now, I don't want to go on at length about why I think that
it was more a sign of a cultural pathology in the institution than it was a
sign of criminality and corruption, but that is my view.
I think that it did expose a genuine flaw—problem, whatever you want to
call it—in Kofi Annan's nature, which is his own sense of the nobility
of his enterprise and of his institution is so great that he couldn't really
grasp the terrible urgency of this attack and that it wouldn't do any good to
say, "But we're the United Nations, we're good guys, we do good things."
And so this thing quickly overwhelmed the institution. I think that really it
will produce some kind of permanent change, that it just doesn't do any good
to say, "We're the United Nations; how can you think we did bad things?"
That's just not the world that the United Nations or anybody else lives in anymore.
QUESTION: Kind of as a follow-on for that, the two questions that you
pointed to—one was the question of the United States' willingness to work
with the United Nations and accepting it as an institution and its necessity;
the other is the question of reform—basically, you said the United States
has changed on the former but not really the latter.
In fact, the answer you just gave, mentioning that there is a cultural pathology
which allowed what was a fairly large scandal—even if the United Nations'
defenders were often too embarrassed to want to admit that, for reasons of the
sort of partisan attack they were facing—that there were the problems with
the peacekeepers and others—the basic question of accountability within
the institution remains a major one.
For me, the question about a future administration is this: Okay, now that the
United States accepts that pragmatically it is going to work with the United
Nations; at the same time, it hasn't really been reformed—in part, because
of the bungling of Mr. Bolton and for other reasons—how then go forward
with this imperfect and problematic institution?
JAMES TRAUB: I wish I had a good answer to that question. One of the things
I did in my book, at the very end of the book, is the chapter called "Model
UN," where I imagine let's create a new United Nations.
One of the reasons I imagined that is because it is very difficult to change
the internal state of any culture, whether that culture is General Electric
or a public school, or the United Nations. And so, if the United Nations is
still dominated by an incredible obsession with process over outcome, if the
question of the right of geographical succession to various jobs remains dominant
and remains a problem—a million different things—how are you going
to change that?
That's why the idea of creating a new institution is attractive. But that's
just a hypothetical exercise. It is not going to happen.
So one thing you would hope of the successor, Ban
Ki-Moon, who I don't think is going to have the kind of voice on moral issues
that Kofi Annan did—I'd be very happy to be proved wrong; people didn't
think Kofi Annan would, and he did, and he surprised people—but, for various
reasons, I don't think it is likely. But what you would hope is that, because
he is an outsider and because he comes from a culture which puts tremendous
stress on institutional effectiveness, once he gets in there, he'll think, "Wow!
This really doesn't work."
There's a lot that an individual can do, both because there is some scope for
action by a Secretary-General, but also because how he acts and how he demands
that others act matter. And so, to that extent things can be done.
But the institutional problems that require approval of the other members, that's
a huge problem. The one place where the American role does matter is, by virtue
of the United States being unyielding on the stuff it wanted, it gave license
to others to be unyielding on the stuff they wanted or the stuff they wanted
to block. And so, one reason why big pieces of the reform didn't succeed, including
management reform, is that the United States made it incredibly easy for the,
let's say, three-quarters of the members who actually don't really want management
reform, at least the way the United states and others see it—it made it
easy for them to block it, because the United States was blocking what they
wanted. This comes under the heading of it's not that hard for the United States
to get what it wants in the United Nations. It has to be willing to pay that
relatively modest price, and in this case it wasn't going to pay any price at
all.
QUESTION: I wonder if you could say a little more about what you think the
United Nations' side of this relationship should be. In other words, much of
your presentation was the United Nations is on the receiving end of what the
United States wants or doesn't want. You were beginning to talk about this with
the new Secretary-General. But what kind of relationship or what kind of approach
do you think the new Secretary-General should take to the United States, particularly
bearing in mind that much of the developing world thinks the United Nations
is already much too beholden to the United States and sort of attacks the Secretary-General's
position from the other side? So what do you think, and then maybe link to that
whether you think the pressure is going to be for the next Secretary-General
to be more secretary than general?
JAMES TRAUB: Maybe there's a connection between those two questions, which
is every Secretary-General, in effect, is hired to be more secretary than general,
because the members —or most of them, or the ones who count—don't
want him to be a big public force out there, because they see that as subtracting
from their own authority.
When Kofi Annan can basically whip up public opinion to such a point that he
can go to Iraq in 1998 even if Washington doesn't really want him to, that's
a kind of power. So he was chosen because people thought he would be an effective
bureaucrat but not more.
Ban Ki-Moon clearly fills that bill. Now, I don't know what he said in his private
conversations with people, but certainly the vibe that comes off him is pure
secretary, not general.
Now, the first part of your question—how do you thread this needle—Well,
the way that he can show Washington that he gets it from Washington's point
of view is management reform. In a way, the management reform, for all that
it's terribly contested, in some ways is less burning ground than the various
peace and security issues that arise over Iran, the Middle East, and so forth.
Those are pure kind of zero-sum fights.
From his point of view, I think he would say: "Look, I recognize the validity
of your complaints about the institution. We've got to find a way to work on
this. I personally in the first ninety days will do this and this and this and
this."
Having said that, though, what does he then say to the rest of the world? He
already is under the assumption, as the foreign minister of a traditional American
ally within the American sphere of protection, of being the American candidate
whom China signed off on for their own reasons. So he is going to have as big
a problem—or more—demonstrating to the rest of the world that he gets
it from their point of view.
Now, what is the issue in "gets it from their point of view?" Well,
it tends to be foreign aid. I mean you can describe it a million different ways,
but the kind of currency is more official development assistance. How much influence
does a Secretary-General have over that? Not a lot. But in terms of what he
says in the world it matters.
So I would guess that the way you would arbitrage this is that he would become
a speaker for—let's say he'd say, "You know, the Americans got it
right with this Millennium Challenge Account of theirs. There has to be a bargain,
where third-world countries agree to become more transparent, more accountable,
etc., etc., etc., and then Western countries have to come through with big-time
aid, trade, debt relief, and so forth." So maybe he should focus on that
as a way of being evenhanded.
Also, in a way, Kofi Annan has already pushed the humanitarian agenda about
as far as it is going to go right now. So there's not much call for his successor,
at least immediately, to push harder on things like the responsibility to protect,
because we already now have the United Nations accepting the responsibility
to protect and not doing anything about it in Darfur. So maybe that would be
a way of dealing with what I think is basically an insoluble problem.
QUESTION: I was just wondering if you could amplify what occurred with
Venezuela—not so much Venezuela, but what that represented within the United
Nations, the vote extended out for so long, and what is that symptomatic of?
JAMES TRAUB: Of course, according to John Bolton, it is symptomatic of
the fact that the United States still has the prestige to prevent Venezuela
from being seated in the Security Council. I think, though, a couple of different
things.
One is Venezuela had a lot of its own currency. As I understand it, they were
basically offering oil allocations—kind of like Saddam Hussein during the
Oil-for-Food thing— in order to get votes. But it can't be a good thing
that a country which was running for this job—essentially what is its platform?
Its platform is "I'm going to stick it to Washington," that's its
platform—that they could get eighty of the 192 members, including lots
of members who themselves would like to stick it to Washington but they know
better than to try to do so in public. This was a private vote. So this allowed
them to actually accomplish what they'd like to do without getting in any trouble
from Washington for doing it.
So it does tell you, I think, how deep is the North/South divide that's between
all the developing countries and Western industrial countries, but also how
inflamed are the feelings against the United States. To me this does not have
the meaning Bolton assigned to it, that Venezuela didn't win. It has the opposite
meaning, which is that it was incredibly difficult to muster the two-thirds
vote and that there were eighty countries that were always willing to vote for
Venezuela.
QUESTION: You said that in your book you have a chapter on a model United
Nations. Do you have a page on the model U.S. ambassador to the United Nations?
JAMES TRAUB: As a matter of fact, I do. I am a big fan of Richard
Holbrooke, and frankly I actually kind of like his bad qualities as well
as his good qualities. He doesn't think I do, but just between us.
You know, he was a really tough-minded guy who beat up the United Nations a
lot, but he beat it up to some extent strategically, because he was speaking
to the American audience. He found a very good modus operandi. He is, of course,
persuaded that all of the problems that have happened have happened because
he is gone now. He has explained to me that he had this way of working it out
with the Secretary-General and the big problem now is that Secretary-General
doesn't have a Richard Holbrooke-type figure—of whom there is only one
actually, Richard Holbrooke. But, you know, this is what comes with it. You
know, you don't get the ocean without its roar, so you don't get Holbrooke without
his ego.
The professionals who have been appointed to this job over time—Thomas
Pickering did a fantastic job during the First Gulf War.
John Negroponte was dealt an impossible hand and has never gotten much credit
for what he did. I think he was actually quite effective in a hopeless situation.
There have been a lot of good U.S. ambassadors.
It normally just doesn't matter. I mean it mattered in Holbrooke's case, it
mattered in Bolton's case. It matters at least marginally in everybody's case,
but not that much. And so, the question is much more the administration. The
ambassador tells you something about where they are coming from, which may be
as important as what the ambassador does or doesn't do.
QUESTION: I want to congratulate both Barbara and you for really being among
the few people who understand the holistic framework of human rights within
the United Nations.
JAMES TRAUB: Thank you.
QUESTIONER: You have recently written in The New York Times about
human rights too and the new Secretary-General.
My question is: Do you think it was a decision of the United Nations to get
rid of Mary
Robinson, who was an excellent commissioner? Then, the other thing is, what
do you see the future of human rights at the United Nations?
JAMES TRAUB: Barbara, do you know the answer to the first question, because
I don't?
[Inaudible].
JAMES TRAUB: Yes, right. She was considered—this is exactly what
the United States and others fear in a Secretary-General—that is to say,
becoming in effect an independent agent and seeing yourself as having an independent
platform. She was seen as far too critical of the United States, far too—well,
far too critical of the United States probably just about says it.
By virtue of what he said and did over the last decade, Kofi Annan has really
succeeded in infusing human rights into every crevice of the United Nations.
When you have a peacekeeping resolution, it includes stipulations about protecting
human rights.
So the question now is: To what extent is that institutionalized such that it
will not unravel in the case of a new person? Now, I don't know the answer to
that. But I do think that, in addition to what he said, which I suppose does
depend on an ongoing rhetorical commitment—and there I am quite skeptical
of what Ban Ki-Moon will do, but one doesn't know—but there are also all
these ways in which it became institutionalized. I tend to think that's permanent,
but I don't know.
And then, of course, above all that is the question of whether there can be
an effective human rights body, whether the Human Rights Council is better than
the Human Rights Commission. The answer so far is no.
QUESTION: I was hoping you could comment about the relationship that
existed between Secretary Annan and Secretary
Powell, what type of relationship there was. And secondly, if you could
comment or speculate on if Ambassador Bolton is not reconfirmed, who are the
candidates who are being considered?
JAMES TRAUB: You know, there is this assumption that Annan and Powell must
have had a great relationship because they are both black men. I don't know
if that's true. I saw them together only once. There was a videoconference having
to do with organizing a response to the tsunami. I was just struck by Powell's
kind of military brusqueness. I was struck by the difference in the two men.
They could not have been more different as people. This one, impatient: "Here's
the agenda, let's get it done. Good talking to you, Kofi. Bye." On the
other side, Kofi Annan's solicitousness and the wish to create a nice atmosphere
around everything and so forth.
So they had very good relations, but how close they were I don't know. I'm not
persuaded—and it may be that in some ways he had more comfortable relations
with Rice. I'm honestly not sure. Probably Edward knows the answer to that better
than I do, but he's not saying either.
As for the new person, I don't know. There have been several names. One is Zamai
Halozad, who was our ambassador in Afghanistan and now in Iraq, which would
be, I think, really good. Though I know he's a neo-con and all that, the guy
has done great work. He deserves a break. He should be allowed to live in the
Waldorf for a couple years after five years of that stuff. He is also a Muslim,
which would be very good.
Then, Paula
Dobriansky, of whom I have a less high opinion.
PARTICIPANT: Who?
JAMES TRAUB: Paula Dobriansky is our assistant secretary, in effect, for democracy
promotion and other related issues to that. She's a Washington lawyer who, I
guess, is owed a favor or something.
Or they'll find some way to keep Bolton, which would really be dumb, because
it would cause so much unnecessary anger. As a payoff to the Right, I think
the fact that Bush has said, "I'm going to try to re-nominate him"
should be enough. Then he'll fail—"he fought the good fight; let's
move on."
QUESTION: You mentioned at the beginning of your talk that the United
Nations depends on U.S. engagement in the world to succeed if they want to achieve
anything. To what extent does the United States depend on the United Nations
to succeed in the world?
JAMES TRAUB: I think that was the point I was trying to make in my later
remarks, that the United States performed this kind of a test: How far can we
go in the direction of acting all by ourselves? Even the United States turned
out to have its limits.
So I do think that the previous bipartisan consensus was that this is a mutually
beneficial relationship and that this thing called legitimacy actually matters.
So I think you had an administration that did not at some doctrinal level accept
that notion, but then was forced at a practical level to accept it. So, I think,
both operationally—because there are a lot of places the United States
doesn't want to do anything but it wants something to be done; it's happy to
have the United Nations doing it—and then there is this grudging doctrinal
thing where the United States has been forced to recognize that they cannot
dispense with that legitimacy thing, even though they think it is unfair that
they should have to be seeking it in the first place.
JOANNE MYERS: Thank you.